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L'inteiVention
•
milita1re
iOka

The Military
InteiVention
inOka

strategie, communication
et couverture de Ia presse

Strategy, Communication
and Press Coverage

Claude Beauregard
translated by Graham Timms
L'image qui allait devenir le symbole du conflit d'Oka.
Le soldat Patrick Cloutier dans unjace aface avec un
Warriors qui plus tardjut identifie comme etant Brad
Larocque de Saskatchewan.

The picture that would become the symbol of the Oka
conflict. Private Patrick Cloutier in a starring match with

a Warrior later identified as Brad Larocque ofSaskatchewan. (S. Komulainen, Canapress Photo Service)
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Introduction

Introduction
es evenements qui se sont deroules a Oka
au cours de l'ete 1990 representent
l'aboutissement d'une situation jugee
totalement inacceptable par la communaute
Mohawk. Ce qui devait etre a l'origine
l'agrandissement d'un terrain de golf, a
provoque un conflit qui s'est solde par la
mort d'un agent de police de la Surete du
Quebec et par !'intervention des Forces
canadiennes; bref, la crise d'Oka est devenue
une crise nationale.

L

Meme si !'element declencheur est simple a com prendre, la situation a Oka demeure
tres complexe. En effet, l'etude du conflit
permet de constater que la communaute
Mohawk est fortement divisee, que les
gouvernements n'ont pas ete en position
d'agir efficacement et qu'il y a eu une mantee
de !'intolerance au sein de la population
locale.
L' evenement le plus spectaculaire de cette
conflagration est certainement !'intervention
d'une brigade des Forces canadiennes. La
strategic employee par l'Armee fut, au dire
des medias, exemplaire. Effectivement, et
ce, contre toute attente, les militaires ont
adopte une politique d'ouverture face aux
journalistes et ont utilise de la force minimum envers les Mohawks.

T

he incidents which occurred in Oka during
the summer of 1990 represent the outcome
of a situation judged to have been totally
unacceptable by the Mohawk community. What
was originally to have been the enlargement of
a golf course provoked a conflict which ended
in the death of a police officer of the Surete du
Quebec and the intervention of the Canadian
Armed Forces; in short, the Oka crisis became
a national crisis.
Even if the initial cause of the affair is
simple to understand, the situation in Oka
remains very complex. In fact, an examination
of the conflict shows that the Mohawk
community was strongly divided, that
governments were not in a position to react
effectively and that there was a rise in
intolerance amongst the local population.
The most spectacular incident of this
conflagration was certainly the intervention by
a brigade of the Canadian Armed Forces. The
strategy employed by the Army was, as stated
in the media, exemplary. In fact, contrary to
what was expected, the military adopted a
policy of openness to journalists and used a
minimum of force in regards to the Mohawks.
This article will study in greater depth the
aspects of the military strategy during Operation
"Salon" 1 as well as the resulting press coverage.

Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre du
present article, d'etudier plus en profondeur
ces deux aspects de la strategic militaire lors
de !'Operation "Salon"l et la couverture de
presse qui en a decoulee.

I. Rappel des evenements

vant de debuter, il importe de bien comprendre que !'intervention militaire dans
le cadre du conflit d'Oka represente
l'aboutissement d'une situation qui s'est
deterioree au fil des ans. Dans le cinquieme
rapport du comite permanent des affaires
autochtones, presente en mai 1991 etintitule
L' ete de 1990, 2 on amorce !'analyse en
presentant certains faits historiques qui

A

I. Overview of the Precursors

B

efore starting, it is of utmost importance
to understand that the military
intervention within the framework of the Oka
conflict was the outcome of a situation which
deteriorated over a number of years. In the
Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on
Native Affairs, presented in May 1991 under
the title The Summer of 1990, 2 the analysis
begins by presenting certain historical facts
which date to the end of the 19th Century! It
can be seen that the conflict goes back a long
way.
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remontent ala fin du XIXe siecle! C'est dire
que le conflit ne date pas d'hier.
L'annee 1987 semble etre le point de
depart de la crise d'Oka. En effet, c'est en
mars que le Club de golf Oka Inc. tente de
renouveler le bail de son terrain de golf de
neuf trous. Or les habitants de Kanesatake
s'opposent au renouvellement et soutiennent
que les terres leur appartiennent. En mai
1988, le club de golf propose a la ville
d'agrandir le terrain de golf de 9 a 18 trous.
En juin de l'annee suivante, une entente est
conclue entre la municipalite et le club de
golf au regard de la location et de !'expansion
du terrain de golf. Le 10 mars 1990, le
conseil municipal suspend le moratoire sur
l'agrandissement du terrain de golf, et les
Mohawks erigent des barricades afin
d'empecher le deboisement d'une partie de la
foret. Un peu plus tard, des membres de la
societe des Warriors prennent le contr6le des
barricades. Entre le 2 et le 6 juillet, Ia
municipalite et le ministre de la Securite
publique demandent aux Mohawks de
demanteler les barricades. Le 10 juillet, le
Conseil municipal d'Oka sollicite
!'intervention de la Surete du Quebec. Cette
derniere decide d'intervenir le lendemain, et
I' assault aux barricades se solde par la mort
du caporal Lemay.s C'est alors que, dans un
geste de solidarite, les Mohawks de la reserve
de Kahnawake, sur la rive sud duSt-Laurent,
erigent des barricades et bloquent l'acces au
pont Mercier.
Le 6 aout 1990, une demande d'aide des
Forces canadiennes est formulee,
conformement a la Loi sur la defense
nationale, par le ministre de la Securite
publique et procureur general du Quebec, M.
Sam Elkas. En effet, au debut de la crise,
l'aide militaire se limitait a une assistance
technique eta des prets d'equipement. Mais
la Surete du Quebec sera rapidement
depassee par les evenements, et l'Armee devra
prendre en charge les operations.

The year 1987 seems to be the starting
point of the Oka crisis. In fact, it was in March
of that year that le Club de golf Oka Inc.,
attempted to renew the lease on its nine hole
golf course. However, the inhabitants of
Kanesatake opposed the renewal and held that
the land belonged to them. In May of 1988, the
golf club proposed the enlargement of the
course from 9 to 18 holes. In June of the
following year, an agreement was reached
between the municipality and the golf course
in regards to the location and expansion of the
golf course. On March 10, 1990, the municipal
council suspended the moratorium on the
enlargement of the golf course and the Mohawks
erected barricades to prevent the clearing of a
section of the forest. Shortly thereafter,
members of the Warriors' Society took control
of the barricades. Between the 2nd and 6th of
July, the municipality and the Minister of
Public Security called upon the Mohawks to
dismantle the barricades. On the lOth of July,
the municipal council of Oka sought the
interventionofthe Suretedu Quebec (SQ). The
SQ decided to intervene the next day and the
assault on the barricades ended in the death of
Corporal Lemay. 3 Meanwhile, in a gesture of
solidarity, Mohawks from the Kahnawake
reserve, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence
River, erected barricades which blocked access
to the Mercier bridge.
On August 6, a request for assistance was
made to the Canadian Armed Forces by the
Minister for Public Security and the Attorney
General of Quebec, Mr. Sam Elkas, as outlined
in the National Defence Act. In fact, at the
beginning ofthe crisis, military assistance was
limited to technical aid and loans of equipment.
However, the Surete du Quebec was rapidly
overcome by the events and the Army had to
take charge of the operation.

II. The Military Intervention
A. The National Defence Act

he military intervention in Oka drew its
inspiration from Section XI ofthe National
Defence Act, entitled "Aid of the Civil Power."
The articles in question are 232 to 242 of the
Act. 4

T
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II. L'intervention militaire
A. La Loi sur la dtifense nationale
'intervention militaire a Oka s'est inspiree
de la partie XI de la Loi sur la defense
nationale, intitulee "AIDE AU POUVOIR
CIVIL." II s'agit des articles 232 a 242 de la
Loi.4

L

Cette Loi stipule qu'une requisition ecrite
par le procureur general de la province dans
laquelle se produit une emeute ou une violation de la paix doit etre adressee au chef d'etatmajor de la defense. Ce dernier juge alors de la
force necessaire a deployer pour faire face au
probleme. II s'agit evidemment d'une mesure
extreme, car l'appel a l'Armee suppose que les
autorites civiles de la province ne peuvent a
elles seules reprimer le conflit.
La Loi sur la defense nationale est appuyee
par les Ordonnances et reglements royaux
applicables auxForces canadiennes, egalement

The Act stipulates that a written request
from the Attorney General of the province in
which a riot or violation of the peace occurs
must be made to the Chief of Staff of the
Canadian Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff
then judges what force is necessary to counter
the problem. It is obviously an extreme measure
given that calling upon the Army assumes that
the civil authority alone can no longer quell the
situation.
The National Defence Act is underpinned
by the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the
Canadian Forces, also known as the QR&O.
Chapter 23, entitled, "Duties in Aid of the Civil
Power" lays out a number of rules and orders
that govern the behaviour of members of the
Armed Forces in the eventuality of such a
situation. In section 5 ("Action to be taken"),
we find an article devoted to the use of firearms
(23.15- "Orders to Fire"). NoteD attached to
this article is of the utmost importance:

Membres du Royal 22e Regiment qui prennent position d Oka.
Members of the Royal 22nd Regiment take up positions at Oka.

26
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appeles ORFC. Le chapitre 23 intitule "AIDE
AU POUVOIR CIVIL" enumere une serie de
reglements et d'ordres qui regissent le
comportement des membres des Forces
canadiennes dans l'eventualite d'une telle
situation. Dans la section 5 ("Mesures a
prendre"), nous retrouvons un article consacre
a l'usage des armes a feu (23.15- "ORDRE DE
TIRER"). La noteD rattachee a cet article est
tres importante:
La prescription qui empeche de pousser la force
au-dela de ce qui est necessaire s'applique en tout
temps: les armes meurtrieres ne doivent pas servir
a prevenir ou a rep rimer des desordres ou des offenses
qui ne sont pas graves, et on ne doit, en aucun cas,
faire usage d'armes a feu si des moyens mains
extremes suffisent. 5

11 importe de bien comprendre la
signification de ce passage. Lors de la Crise
d'octobrede 1970, legouvemementduCanada
a eu recours a la Loi sur les mesures de guerre
pour agir contre le FLQ. Cette loi donnait au
ministere de la Defense nationale carte blanche
en ce qui a trait aux arrestations, ala detention
des individus, aux fouilles, etc. Par contre,
l'aide au pouvoir civil comprend un ensemble
de regles completement differentes. L'usage de
la force est limitee au minimum. C'est dans ce
contexte que la strategie militaire s'elaborera.

B. La strategie militaire

P

our illustrer la strategie militaire employee
au cours des evenemen ts d'Oka, nous
nous servirons d'un article redige par le
brigadier-general J.A. Roy, commandant de la
5e Brigade mecanisee du Canada a Valcartier
et d'un article paru dans la revue Sentinelle.
Selon le brigadier-general J.A. Roy, il est
hors de tout doute que les forces policieres ne
pouvaient plus maitriser la situation. Les
armes a la disposition des Warriors (armes
d'assaut AK-47, AR-15 et Uzi, armes antiblindes, mitrailleuses, etc.) donnaient a ces
derniers une puissance de feu superieure a
celle des forces policieres. De plus, le reseau
des installations de defense des Warriors
representait un systeme de defense militaire
classique. Ceci explique que "le Gouvernement

The law, that no more force may be used than is
necessary, applies at all times; lethal weapons must
not be used to prevent or suppress minor disorders
or offenses which are not serious, and in no case
shall firearms be discharged ifless extreme measures
will suffice. 5

It is important to fully understand the
significance ofthis article. During the October
Crisis of 1970, the Government of Canada
used the War Measures Act against the FLQ.
This act effectively gave to the Department of
National Defence carte blanche in terms of
power to arrest and detain individuals and
groups, etc. As opposed to the "Aid of the Civil
Power" which is comprised of a range of
completely different rules, the use of force is
limited to a minimum. It was within this
context that the military strategy was developed.

B. The Military Strategy
n article written by Brigadier-General J .A.
Roy, commander of the Fifth Canadian
Mechanized Brigade in Valcartier, will be used
to illustrate the military strategy employed
during the events at Oka. In addition, an
article which appeared in the magazine Sentinel
will be consulted.

A

According to Brigadier-General Roy, it was
beyond all doubt that the police forces could no
longer control the situation. The arms available
to the Warriors (AK-47, AR-15 and Uzi assault
rifles, anti-tank weapons, machine guns, etc.)
gave them fire power superior to that of the
anything the police could muster. Also, the
network of defensive installations created by
the Warriors was an example of classic military
defence. This explains why "the Government
of Quebec, when faced with a situation which
was taking on the appearance of guerilla
warfare, had no other alternative but to take
advantage of its right to call upon the Canadian
Armed Forces. "6
The military strategy was therefore based,
as we have mentioned, on the rules which
govern the Aid of the Civil Power and take into
account the use of minimum force. "This basic
principle remained the premise for all our
planning. "7 Still using the article of Brigadier27
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du Quebec, face a une situation qui prenait des
allures de guerilla, n'a eu d'autre altemative
que de se prevaloir de son droit de faire appel
aux Forces armees canadiennes. "6
La strategie militaire sera done basee,
comme nous l'avons mentionne, sur les regles
regissant I' aide au pouvoir civil et qui font etat
de !'usage minimum de la force. "Ce principe
de base demeurait premisse a toute notre
planification. "7 Toujours d'apres I'article du
brigadier-general J.A. Roy, on peut en deduire
que la strategie militaire sera fondee sur les
principes suivants:
1. Un deploiement militaire dynamique est necessaire
pour venir a bout d'une telle situation (il s'agit ici
d'impressionner l'adversaire);
2. L'Armee ne peut se permettre de s'en laisser imposer par les Warriors (faire preuve de fermete tout
en evitant des actions violentes);
3. Les militaires participant a !'operation doivent etre
bien prepares mentalement et physiquement;
4. II faut refuser d'utiliser les armes "en premier,"
mais si les Warriors decident autrement, Ia replique
sera immediate et a caractere militaire;
5. La progression des operations doit representer un
enchainement logique, et l'Armee doit conserver !e
"momentum" et !'initiative sur !e terrain;
6. Une campagne de relations publiques doit tenir Ia
population informee. [Nous reviendrons sur cet
aspect de Ia question.]

Nous ne pouvons que constater que les
militaires ont effectivement applique ces
principes tout au long de I' operation. L'avance
des soldats, qui devait mener les Warriors a se
replier sur le centre de desintoxication, s'est
deroulee de fa«;on graduelle et ferme. Le recours
aux armes a feu a ete evite et les militaires ont
fait preuve d'un sang froid exemplaire.
Cette strategie militaire a ete appliquee
differemment a Oka et a Kahnawake. Le
lieutenant-colonel Robin Gagnon explique ainsi
sa demarche visant a l'ouverture du pont
Mercier:

General Roy, the principles on which the
military strategy was developed can be deduced:
1. A dynamic military deployment was necessary to
bring an end to such a situation. (In this instance
it was a matter of making an impression on the
adversary).
2. The Army can in no way allow the Warriors to take
an upper hand. (It must be steadfast, all the while
avoiding violence).
3. Soldiers participating in the operation must be
well prepared mentally and physically.
4. The Army must refuse to be the first to use arms.
However, if the Warriors decide otherwise, the
reply shall be immediate and military in nature.
5. The progression of operations must have a logical
sequence, and the Army must maintain the
momentum and initiative in the field.
6. A public relations campaign must keep the
population informed. [We will return to this aspect
of the question.]

Without question, the soldiers effectively
upheld these principles during the entirety of
the operation. The advance of the soldiers,
which brought on the eventual withdrawal of
the Warriors into the detoxification centre, was
undertaken in a gradual and firm manner. The
necessity to use weapons was avoided and the
personnel involved showed exemplary courage.
This military strategy was applied differently
in Oka and Kahnawake. Lieutenant-Colonel
Robin Gagnon explained his approach to
opening the Mercier Bridge:
"When we arrived in the Kahnawake area, tension
was running extremely high," says LCol Gagnon. "At
my first meeting, I attempted to defuse the situation.
I explained my mission and told them that my men
would not aim their weapons at them provided that
the Warriors did likewise."
An atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding
soon developed between LCol Gagnon and the
Mohawks. LCol Gagnon's personal commitment,
calm and attentive approach to native reality largely
contributed to the dismantling of the barricades and
the re-opening of Mercier Bridge without one shot
being fired. He now has a good knowledge of Mohawk
customs and says he regrets that he had to gain it on
the job.
"It would have helped beforehand to be familiar,
not only with the underlying reasons for their
demands, but also with their culture and traditions.
Their outlook is altogether different from ours.

28
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Discussion entre trois
militaires qui ontjoue
un role important d
Oka. De gauche d
droite, le mqjor Alain
Tremblay, commandant de compagnie,
le lieutenant-colonel
Pierre Daigle, commandant du 2e
bataillon du Royal
22e Regiment et le
brigadier-general
Armand Roy, commandant de la 5e Brigade mecanisee.
A discussion between
three CF members
who played a major
role atOka. From left
to right, Major Alain
Tremblay, Company
Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre
Daigle, Commanding
Officer 2nd Battalion,
Royal 22e Regiment,
and Brigadier-General Armand Roy,
Commander
5th
Mechanized Brigade.

"A notre arrivee dans la region de Kahnawake, la
tension etait tres forte, rappelle le lieutenant-colonel
Gagnon. Des mes premieres rencontres, j'ai tente de
desamorcer la situation. Je leur ai explique rna
mission et je leur ai dit que mes hommes ne
pointeraient pas d'armes sur eux a condition que les
Warriors en fassent autant."
Entre le lieutenant-colonel Gagnon et les Mohawks
se developpa rapidement un climat de confiance et de
comprehension mutuelle. Son engagement personnel,
son calme et son approche attentive a la realite
autochtone ont largement contribue au
demantelement des barricades et a l'ouverture du
pont Mercier sans qu'un seul coup de feu ne soit tire.
Le lieutenant-colonel Gagnon possede aujourd'hui
une bonne connaissance des us et coutumes des
Mohawks et dit regretter d'avoir du acquerir ces
connaissances sur place et non pas au cours de la
phase preparatoire.
"Il eut ete preferable de connaitre non seulement
les causes profondes de leurs revendications, mais
aussi leur culture et leurs tradition, explique-t-il.
Leur vision des chases est tout a fait differente de la
notre. De plus, les chefs n'ont aucun pouvoir
decisionnel. Il leur faut constamment consulter le
peuple et parvenir a un consensus." 8

Moreover, the chiefs have no decision-making power
whatever. They must constantly consult their people
and reach a consensus." 8

However, events in Oka were to be entirely
different.
The style of government,
characterized by the absence of a band council,
rendered discussions useless. 9 The companies
in Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Daigles' battalion
had to bring pressure to bear in the field. Major
Alain Tremblay, a company commander,
justified the action he took when faced by
Warriors in the pine woods of the municipal
golf course on September 1:
"I took a calculated risk during that operation,"
admits Maj Tremblay. "I was not supposed to push
our advance so far, but the CO had authorized me to
exploit the terrain. We met resistance at the first
barricades. I evaluated the situation and, despite the
Warrior's threats. I decided to continue the advance.
The Warriors seemed surprised and fell back." 10
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Or, on allait proceder tout autrement a Oka.
Le mode de gouvernement, caracterise par
!'absence d'un conseil de bande, a fait en sorte
que les discussions etaient inutiles. 9 Les
compagnies du bataillon du lieutenant-colonel
Pierre Daigle ont du exercer des pressions sur
le terrain.
Le major Alain Tremblay,
commandant d'une compagnie, justifie ainsi
sa demarche lorsqu'il se retrouva en face des
Warriors dans la pinede du golf municipal le
ler septembre:
"J'ai pris des risques calcules au cours de cette
operation, avoue le major Tremblay. Je ne devais pas
pousser notre avance aussi loin, mais le commandant
m'avait autorise a exploiter le terrain. Nous avons
ete confrontes a une premiere barricade. J'ai evalue
Ia situation et, en depit des menaces proferees par les
Warriors, j'ai decide de poursuivre l'avance. Les
Warriors ont semble surpris et ils se sont replies." 10

C. Les lecrons apprises
elan le Brigadier-general J. A. Roy,
plusieurs le<;;ons furent apprises pendant
le deroulement de !'Operation "Salon."
D'apres ce dernier, il est important que les
dirigeants politiques soient informes des
possibilites et des limites d'une organisation
militaire et qu'ils supportent entierement
!'intervention.

S

La strategie militaire et les le<;;ons retenues
seront egalement confirmees lors d'une
interview donne par le lieutenant-general
Kent R. Foster, commandant de la Force
mobile, qui a ainsi explique son but et son
role au cours de ce conflit:
Sentinelle: Vous etes surement soulage que
!'operation militaire ait ete menee sans perte de vie
ou blessure serieuse?
General Foster: Mon but ultime a toujours ete de
parvenir a une resolution du conflit sans qu'une
autre personne ne perde la vie, tout en sachant
pertinemment bien que le caporal Lemay avait ete
tue en essayant de mettre fin au conflit. Cette
volonte d'en arriver a une fin pacifique sans faire
usage de la force ou tout au plus d'une force minimal e.
decoulait du desir d'eviter une autre mort. Et ce
desir a ete partage par toutle monde, y compris les
autochtones. Pour mes soldats, cela a exige une
discipline intense, une obeissance totale aux ordres
et !'execution de taches qu'ils ont trouve (sic) tres
difficiles en raison des insultes et des coups qu'ils
ont re~;us. De plus, ils ne pouvaient pas repliquer de
la meme maniere.n

C. The Lessons Learned
ccording to Brigadier-General Roy, many
lessons were leamed during the events of
Operation "Salon." He indicated that it was
important that political leaders recognize the
possibilities and limitations of a military
organization and that they wholly support the
intervention.

A

The military strategy and the lessons
learned were also outlined in an interview
given by Lieutenant-General Kent R. Foster,
commander of the Mobile Force. He explained
his role and goals during the conflict as follows:
Sentinel: You must be relieved that the military
operation was conducted Without loss of life and
serious injury?
General Foster: My aim from the beginning was to
resolve the crisis Without further loss of life. A
Quebec policeman had already been killed trying to
resolve the problem and it was evident to everybody
that no one else should die over this. For my soldiers,
this meant intensive discipline, following orders,
dealing with uncomfortable situations such as
receiving abuse, and so on. It also meant they could
not respond in kind. n

Lieutenant-General Foster also affirmed
that he had to explain the undertaking of the
Forces to the many different levels of
government as well as play the role of expert.
I'll give you an example. If you want to conduct an
offensive kind of operation on the Mercier bridge
with the kind of weaponry that would have been
required at the height of the crisis, you are talking
about an evacuation of about 100,000 people just to be sure that no one dies accidentally. Even
then, there would be a good chance of something
going wrong. Those kinds of potential consequences
had to be explained ... 12

The work of educating the politicians also
revealed itself to be of great importance for the
population as a whole. It is for this reason that
the focus now switches to the communication
strategies employed by the Armed Forces during
the Oka crisis.

30
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Le lieutenant-general Foster affirme aussi
qu'il a du expliquer les capacites des Forces
canadiennes aux differents paliers de
gouvernement et qu'il a du jouer le role d'expert.
Pour illustrer cela, je vous donne un exemple. Si
vous aviez voulu mener une operation offensive sur
le pont Mercier en utilisant le type d'armes qu'il eut
(sic) ete necessaire d'utiliser dans la periode ou la
crise avait atteint son apogee, il aurait fallu evacuer
environ 100,000 personnes afin d'eviter que
quiconque ne so it tue accidentellement. Et meme la,
il y aurait eu de fortes chances qu'un accident ne se
produise. 11 me fallait done expliquer ce genre de
situation et c'est ce que en quoi mon travail a surtout
consiste ... 12

Ce travail d' education au pres des politiciens
allait aussi se reveler d'une grande importance
pour la population du pays. C'est pourquoi
nous devons nous pencher sur la strategie de
communication employee par les Forces
canadiennes pendant la crise d'Oka.

III. La strategie de communication
A. La mise en contexte

a perception de l'Armee au sein de la
population canadienne, peut-etre plus
particulierement au Quebec, a completement
change dans la foulee des evenements survenus
a Oka. Une des principales raisons de ce
changement est la strategie de communication
tres efficace employee par l'Armee.

L

Comme nous le verrons, l'Armee s'est
associee aux medias afin de non seulement
tenir la population informee, mais aussi
d'exercer une influence sur les evenements.
De plus il nous a paru evident que l'Armee a
refuse de passer pour la coupable dans ce
conflit. Les militaires ont du intervenir a Oka
afin de regler un conflit qui a pris naissance a
la suite d'une deterioration constante de la
situation. Les gouvernements sont dans une
grande mesure responsables de cet etat de fait.

III. The Communication Strategy
A. Contextual Summary
he Canadian peoples' perception of the
Army, perhaps more markedly in Quebec,
changed completely in the whirlwind of events
at Oka. One of the principal reasons for this
change was the effective strategy of
communication used by the Army. As will be
seen, the Army involved itself with the media in
order not only to inform the population, but
also to influence the events. Also, it seems
obvious that the Army refused to play the
culprit in the affair. The military had to
intervene in order to sort out a conflict which
began following the constant deterioration of
the situation. Governments were largely
responsible for this situation.

T

B. The Development of the
Communication Strategy 13
he communication strategy was developed
in the headquarters of the Mobile Force
located at Canadian Forces Base St. Hubert
near Montreal. When Lieutenant-General Kent
Foster, the Chief of the Ground Forces and
regional commander for Quebec, had been
given the responsibility for Operation "Salon"
and the Fifth Brigade from Valcartier had been
designated the operational force, an
organization was put in place at the centre for
tactical operations in St. Hubert.

T

Military organization at the headquarters
level is always composed of five task groups:
G-1:
G-2:
G-3:
G-4:
G-5:

Personnel
Intelligence
Operations
Logistics
Civil-Military Cooperation

The committee of greatest interest to us
here is G-5. Its mandate was to outline for the
commander the course of action in regards to
relations with the civilian authorities. During
Operation "Salon," numerous sub-committees
were put in place within the task group. The
first was a damage control body which looked
to identify, record and repair any eventual
damages. Then a liaison sub-committee was
created to assure the effective coordination of
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B. L' elaboration de Ia strategie de
communication 13
a strategie de communication a ete elaboree
ala base de St-Hubert, pres de Montreal,
au Quartier general de la Force mobile.

L

Lorsque le lieutenant-general Kent Foster,
commandant regional pour le territoire du
Quebec et chef de l'armee de terre' a ete nomme

efforts of the various and sundry organizations
participating in the crisis (for example: the
office of Premier Robert Bourassa, the office of
the Minister for Public Security, Mr. Sam Elkas,
the negotiating team, the municipalities, the
RCMP, the Red Cross, etc.) A legal office was
included in the G-5 group in order to answer
any questions relating to the participation of
the Armed Forces as well as to give legal
counsel to any interested parties. Finally, the

Le mqjor-generalKent
R. Foster, commandant de la Force mobile, qui s'adresse
aux journalistes d
Oka.
Major-General Kent
R. Foster,
Commander Mobile Command, talks to reporters atOka.

responsable de !'Operation "Salon" et que Ia 5e
brigade de Valcartier a ete designee force
operationelle, une organisation a ete mise en
place au centre d'operation tactique a StHubert.
Une organisation militaire a 1' echelon d'un
Quartier general se compose toujours de cinq
cellules:
G 1:
G2:
G3:
G4:
G5:

Personnel
Renseignements
Operations
Logistique
Cooperation civilo-militaire

Public Affairs Branch, which is normally the
responsibility of the deputy commander of the
Mobile Force in a crisis, was integrated into the
G-5 committee. This allowed the officers in
charge of public relations to maintain direct
contact with the operations group and therefore
react effectively. "It was the first time that this
structure was put in place." 14
The underlying principle in relation to
communications in regards to a military
organization is therefore the following:
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La cellule qui nous interesse plus
particulierement iciest la G5. Son mandat
consiste a elaborer' pour le commandant, les
lignes de conduite en ce qui a trait aux
relations avec les autorites civiles. Lars de
!'Operation "Salon," plusieurs organismes
ont ete mis sur pied au sein de cette cellule:
tout d'abord un organisme de contr6le des
dommages visant a identifier, consigner ou
reparer ceux-ci; puis un organisme de liaison
afin de veiller ala bonne coordination entre
les diverses organisations participant au
conflit (par exemple: le bureau du premier
ministre Bourassa, le bureau du ministre
Elkas (Securite publique), l'equipe de
negociation, les municipalites, la GRC, la
Croix-Rouge, etc.) Un bureaujuridique a ete
inclus dans la cellule G5 pour repondre a
toute question relative ala participation des
Forces canadiennes et donner des conseils
juridiques aux personnes interessees. Enfin,
la branche des affaires publiques, qui releve
habituellement du commandant adjoint de
la Force mobile en situation de crise, a ete
integree a la cellule G5. Ceci a permis aux
officiers des affaires publiques d'entretenir
des relations etroites avec la cellule des
operations et de reagir efficacement. "C'etait
la premiere fois que cette structure etait
mise en application." 14
Le
grand
principe
relatif aux
communications, en ce qui a trait a
!'organisation militaire, est done le suivant:
Il est essentiel qu'une coordination etroite et constante
s'etablisse entre les strateges operationnels et les
membres de la cellule des affaires publiques car il
faut etre bien informes et comprendre les activites
operationelles en cours et a venir afin de pouvoir en
appuyer efficacement le deroulement. 15

En ce qui concerne la strategie de
communication,
L'approche de notre strategie d'affaires publiques
sera pro-active dans le sens que toute information
concernant les activites de l'armee et qui ne mettrait
pas en danger la securite de !'operation sera annoncee
ala population par le biais des medias. 16

It is essential that direct and constant coordination
be established between the operational strategists
and the public affairs committee because it is
necessary to understand and be well informed of
present and future operational activities in order to
be able to effectively support their undertaking. 15

In regards to communications strategy,
The approach to our public affairs strategy will be
pro-active in the sense that any information
concerning the Army's activities that does not risk
putting the security of our operation in danger will be
announced to the public by means of the media. 16

The Army's communications plan rested
on two important themes which were
continually repeated to the public. First, the
Armed Forces were dedicated to resolving the
crisis through peaceful means with the
minimum required force, and secondly, the
intervention of the Army is at the request of the
Government of Quebec. In this way the Army
established its credibility.

C. The Result
ontrary to what one might think, the Army
largely appreciated the presence of
journalists in the field. Here is how BrigadierGeneral Roy analyzed their presence:

C

Strategically. certain aspects of the intervention
went beyond the responsibility oftactical commanders
and influenced the conflict in its entirety. The
approach taken by the media, for example, when
effectively developed, increased the operational
benefits expected in the strategic plan. The presence
of reporters served not only to inform the people but
also to influence them to a certain point. In fact,
announcing all troop and equipment movements via
the press contributed to a reduction of tensions in
the field and even went as far as to spark dialogue.
Also, the omnipresence of cameras encouraged
opposing groups to remain calm and not commit
themselves to an escalation of violence. When first
looking for the support of the people, the Warriors did
not know how to effectively exploit the support given
them by Canadians at the beginning of hostilities.
Their violent and unjustified actions, once broadcast,
had the effect of turning opinion against the Mohawks.
A public relations plan which included an information
campaign definitely aided in the understanding of
our role in the crisis.
In a world where information is of capital
importance, the media provides everything. In openly
expressing our point of view, the risk of ambiguity
was erased. 17
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Deux militaires du peloton de reconnaissance du 2e bataillon du Royal 22e Regiment en action d Oka.
Two members of the reconnaissance platoon of the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment, in action at Oka.

Le plan de communication de l'Armee repose
sur deux themes importants qui seront sans
cesse repetes a la population. Premierement,
les Forces canadiennes s'engagent a resoudre
la crise de fa~on pacifique avec la force minimum
requise et, deuxiemement, la participation de
l'Armee se fait ala demande du gouvernement
du Quebec. L'Armee etabliera ainsi sa
credibilite.

Therefore, the Army's communications
strategy was fairly simple: openness to
journalists, access to information without
compromising the security of operations or
personnel and finally, insistence on the nonviolent role of the Army as well as its obligation
to intervene at the request of the Quebec
government. Military personnel would also, as
far as possible, work with the media in order to
influence events.
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C. Le resultat

IV. The Analysis of Press Coverage
A. Definition of a Theoretical Framework

ontrairement ace que l'on pourrait penser,
l'Arm ee a grandement apprecie la presence
des journalistes sur le terrain. Voici comment
le brigadier-general J .A. Roy analyse cette
presence:

C

Strategiquement. certains aspects de !'intervention
depassant (sic) les secteurs de responsabilite des
commandants tactiques et influencent le conflit dans
son entier. L'approche mediatique et l'interoperabilite, par exemple, constituent des elements
qui, developpes efficacement, augmentent les
benefices operationels cscomptes sur le plan
strategique. La presence de reporters permet non
seulement d"informer la population sur ces
evenements mais les influencent (sic) jusqu'a une
certaine mesure. En effet. l'annonce de tous les
mouvements de troupes ou d'equipement via les
medias a contribue a reduire les tensions sur le
terrain allant meme jusqu'a amorcer le dialogue. De
plus, !"omnipresence des cameras incitait les parties
opposees a (sic) conserver le calme eta (sic) ne passe
commettre dans une escalade de violence.
Recherchant d'abord l'appui de Ia population, les
Warriors n"ont pas su exploiter l'appui que les
canadiens (sic) leur pretaient au debut des hostilites.
Leurs actions violentes et injustifiees, une fois
diffusees. ont eu pour effet de retourner !'opinion
contre les Mohawks. Un plan de relations publiques
comprenant une campagne d'information facilite
definitivement la comprehension de notre role dans
cette crise.
Dans un monde oti !'information s'avere capitale.
les medias apportent beaucoup. En exprimant
ouvertement notre point de vue, le risque d'ambigui:te
s'estompeY

Done, la strategic de communication de
l'Armee est assez simple: ouverture face aux
journalistes, acces a !'information sans
compromettre la securite des operations et des
militaires et, finalement. une insistance sur la
non-violence dans le role de l'Armee et son
obligation a intervenir a la demande du
gouvernement du Quebec. Les militaires
s'associeront aussi aux medias pour influencer
les evenements dans la mesure du possible.

he principal question that an analysis of
newspaper articles should answer must
be posed as follows: Did the press fully
comprehend the military strategy and in what
way did the Army influence events during the
Oka crisis of 1990? In order to answer this
question some 6000 newspaper articles have
been perused of which about 100 were retained.
An analysis will be undertaken through the
study of different themes, in order to better
understand what was at stake in the questions
arrived at.

T

B. The Army's Message

uring a press conference held on August
9. 1990, Lieutenant-General Kent Foster
explained the necessity for military intervention.
He highlighted a certain number of facts: The
Army will intervene at the request of the
Government of Quebec (In fact this was the
first phrase of the speech); 18 the situation is
exceptional, the police cannot resolve the
problem; the Army is intervening under the
principle of minimum use of force. On leaving
the press conference the general reaffirmed
that the Armed Forces "are responding to the
Government of Quebec. ~
The message
remained the same for the duration of the
crisis. The goal of this press conference was to
make clear the rules under which the Army
would operate. The message was well
understood by the newspapers. The next day,
Le Journal de Montreal published an article
entitled "APeacefulArmy!" 20 The author, Michel
Auger, put emphasised that the Army wished
to help resolve the crisis and to inform the
population of events as they developed.

D

19

On the 17th of August 1990, General John
de Chastelain affinned in a press communiqu€ 1
that the Army would relieve the Stlrete du
Quebec. The military message remained clear.
The communique started as such: "In
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IV. Analyse de Ia couverture
de Ia presse
A. Definition d'un cadre theorique
a principale question qu'une analyse des
articles de j oumaux devrait no us permettre
de repondre, doit etre formulee ainsi: est-ce
que la presse a bien saisi la strategie militaire
et dans quelle mesure l'Armee a-t-elle influence
les evenements lors de la Crise d'Oka en 1990?
Pour repondre a cette question, nous avons
depouille environ 6000 articles de journaux et
nous en avons retenu une centaine. Notre
analyse se fera par le biais de l'etude de
differents themes, afin de mieux comprendre
les enjeux des questions abordees.

L

accordance with my commitment to ensure
transparency in the operations of the Armed
Forces, lwouldliketoinformyou that. .. " and,
in the last paragraph he mentions that "The
Canadian Armed Forces will intervene
peacefully. "22 Brigadier-General Armand Roy
who also held a press conference repeated:

For us, there is no question of using the arms which
we possess, unless it is to return fire. while always
using the principle of minimum force, in order to
return fire that could fall on our own positions. 23

B. Le message de l'Armee

Hours after replacing the Stlrete du Quebec
with military personnel, Brigadier-General
Armand Roy declared, "Our mission is a
peaceful one. "24

ars d'une conference de presse tenue le 9
a out 1990, le lieutenant -general Ken Foster
explique a la population la necessite de
!'intervention militaire. Ce demier mettra en
evidence plusieurs messages: l'Armee

Following the failure of negotiations on
August 27, the Army received the order to
dismantle the barricades and to ensure
the free movement of traffic on the roads
and bridges. In a communique, General de

L

Le mqjor Alain
Tremblay lors d'une
communication radio
accompagne
adjudant-maftre.
Maj. Alain Tremblay,
accompanied by a
Master Warrant
Officer, talks over
the radio.
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interviendra a la demande du Gouvernement
du Quebec (il s'agit en fait de la premiere
phrase du texte); 18 la situation est exceptionelle,
et les forces de l'ordre ne peuvent regler le
probleme; le principe d'intervention de l'Armee
est l'usage minimum de la force. A l'issue de la
conference de presse, le lieutenant-general
reaffirme que les forces armees "are responding
to the government of Quebec. "19. Ce message
restera le meme tout au long de la crise. Cette
conference de presse aura pour avantage de
bien faire comprendre les regles que l'Armee
utilisera. Les journaux ant bien compris le
message. Le lendemain, Lejouma[ de Montrea[
publie un article intitule "Une armee
pacifique!" 20 L'auteur, Michel Auger, met
l'accent sur le fait que l'Armee veut aider a
resoudre la crise et informer la population sur
le deroulement des evenements.
Le 17 aout 1990, le general John de
Chastelain affirme dans un communique de
presse21 que l'Armee relevera la Surete du
Quebec. Le message militaire demeure bien
evident. Le communique debute ainsi: "En
accord avec man engagement d'assurer la
transparence des operations des FC, je desire
vous informer ... " et. au dernier paragraphe,
on mentionne que "les Forces canadiennes se
proposent d'intervenir pacifiquement. "22 Le
brigadier-generalArmand Roy, qui tiendra aussi
une conference de presse, repetera:
II n'est pas question pour nous d'employer les armes
que tous nous avons, si ce n'est pour riposter,
toujours en employant le principe de la force
minimum, pour riposter au feu qui pourrait venir sur
nos positions. 23

Quelques heures a pres le remplacement de
la Surete du Quebec par les militaires, le
brigadier-general Armand Roy declare "Notre
mission est pacifique. "24
A l'issue de 1' echec des negociations, so it le
27 aout, l'Armee re<;;oit l'ordre de demanteler
les barricades et d'assurer la circulation sur
les routes et les pants. Dans un communique,
le general John de Chastelain precise bien que
cette demande provient du premier ministre
Bourassa et ajoute:
Les barricades doivent et devraient etre demantelees
pacifiquement sans que l'on ait recours ala force. Je

Chastelain made it clear that the request came
from Premier Bourassa and added:
The barricades must and shall be dismantled
peacefully without the necessity of force. I can
assure you that the Canadian troops will not use
force unless brought to it by the Warriors.
In accordance with my commitment to ensure
transparency in the operations of the Armed Forces,
we shall continue to announce our intentions. 25

The newspapers picked up on General de
Chastelain's message and emphasized the
peaceful approach of the operation. 26 On
September 6, 1990, General de Chastelain
announced measures which sought to bring
an end to the conflict in Oka. Mohawks wishing
to drop their weapons would be placed under
military guard. For them, "this proposition
guaranteed a dignified and peaceful end to the
crisis." 27
The Army's message remained unchanged
during Operation "Salon." All levels of the
military hierarchy repeated it incessantly. The
message was broadcast accurately and on a
regular basis by the media.

C. The Military Strategy

F

ollowing the press conference of August
9,1990, the Army drew attention to the
preparation of troops and materiel which were
to be deployed. It was most certainly an
attempt to create an impression of superiority
in order to impress the adversary. Numerous
examples in the newspapers clearly showed
this fact. Le So[ei[ from Quebec City mentions
that "4400 soldiers are preparing by
familiarizing themselves with the situation, "28
and in Le Droit one article read, "4400 soldiers
available." 29 The Army was described in the
newspapers as an organization which can easily
take control of the situation and was ready to
intervene. In this vein one sees pictures of
Lieutenant-General Kent Foster giving his press
conferences with maps at the ready, 30 pictures
of heavy equipment (ie. a mobile battering
ram), soldiers training in hand-to-hand combat
and crowd control. 31 The pictures of military
camps also gave an impression of discipline. 32
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puis vous assurer que les troupes canadiennes
n'uliliseront pas Ia force a mains que les Warriors ne
les y contraignent.
Conformement a mon engagement d'assurer Ia
transparence des operations des FC, no us
continurons d'annoncer nos intentions. 2 s

Les joumaux reprennent les propos du
general de Chastelain et insistent sur !'approche
pacifique de !'operation. 26 Le 6 septembre
1990, ce dernier annoncera egalement une
mesure visant a regler Ia conflagration a Oka.
Les Mohawks voulant deposer leurs armes
seront places sous garde militaire. Pour ces
derniers, "cette proposition garantit une fin
digne et pacifique a Ia crise." 27
Le message de l'Armee demeura inchange
au cours de !'Operation "Salon." To us Ies
niveaux de Ia hierarchie militaire le repeteront
sans cesse. Les medias transmettront tres
fidelement et regulierement ce message.
C. La strategie militaire
la suite de Ia conference de presse du 9
aout 1990, l'Armee met !'accent sur Ia
preparation des troupes et le materiel qui sera
deploye. II s'agit certainement de creer une
impression de superiorite et d'impressionner
l'adversaire. Les journaux representeront tres
bien ce fait. Plusieurs exemples permettent de
le demontrer: Le Soleil de Quebec mentionne
que "4400 soldats se preparent en se
familiarisant avec Ia situation," 28 et on peut lire
dans Le Droit" 4400 soldats disponibles. "29 Les
journaux decrivent l'Armee comme une
organisation qui peut prendre facilement Ie
contr6le de Ia situation et qui est prete a
intervenir. Ainsi peut-on voir des photos qui
representent le lieutenant-general Kent Foster
donnant sa conference de presse avec carte a
l'appui, 30 photos d'equipement lourd (beliers
mecaniques), militaires qui s'entrainent au
combat corps a corps et au contr6le des foules. 31
Les photos des camps miliaires donnet aussi
une image de discipline. 32 L'impression de
force se fait plus forte lorsque des troupes du
Nouveau-Brunswick arrivent a Chateauguay
et Oka le 16 aout 1990. Par exemple, The
Gazette ecrit "Armed forces move in 680 more

A

This impression of force became yet stronger
when troops from New Brunswick arrived in
Chateauguay and Oka on August 19th, 1990.
For example, The Gazette wrote, "Armed Forces
move in 680 more troops from New Brunswick"
along with pictures of two soldiers on an
armoured personnel carrier with a machine
gun.33
When the Army replaced the Surete du
Quebec on the barricades, the newspapers
illustrated quite well the impression of strength
given by the Army. As witnessed in Le Devoir,
"The Army tightens its noose," 34 and in La
Pre sse, "The Army squeezes the pliers. "35 Here
again the papers published pictures of soldiers
armed to the teeth mounted on an armoured
personnel carrier.
As mentioned earlier, in Chateauguay, the
Army opted for discussion in order to bring
about a peaceful end to the situation. In this
case the press seemed particularly offended
when soldiers shook hands with the Warriors.
Le Devoir published a photo with the caption,
"The crowd in Chateauguay which had warmly
applauded the arrival of the Army was much
less appreciative yesterday of the handshakes
given the Warriors." 36 La Presse wrote, "An
overly cordial handshake?" 37 This handshake
served to outline the Army's good faith and
showed its true value during the dismantling of
the barricades in Chateauguay.
On the 27th of August the Army was called
upon to intervene following the failure of
negotiations. Lieutenant-General Kent Foster
held a press conference the next day in order to
inform the population that the situation had
now become a military operation. Included in
the conference was the presentation of a video
which revealed the installations and weapons
of the Warriors. The newspapers were
impressed by the results. LeJoumaldeMontreal
stated, "More than the press conference given
by Lieutenant-General Foster, it was the
screening of the video, prepared by the Armed
Forces, that made more than a few think
twice. "38 The Army also used the video to show
that it was able to control the situation. The
Globe and Mail wrote, "Army ready for combat,
video indicates." 39
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troops from New Brunswick," et on presente
deux soldats sur un vehicule blinde avec une
mitrailleuse. 33
Lorsque l'Armee remplace la Surete du
Quebec aux barricades, les journaux illus trent
assez bien !'impression de fermete que l'Armee
degage. Nous pouvons lire dans Le Devoir que
"L'armee resserre son etau, "34 et dans La
Presse, "L'armee referme la tenaille. "35 lei
encore les journaux publient des photos de
militaires armes au poing et equipes de blindes.
Comme nous l'avons deja mentionne, a
Chateauguay les militaires ont surtout opte
pour la discussion afin d'en arriver a une fin
pacifique. lei, la presse se montrera surtout
offusquee de la poignee de main offerte par les
militaires aux Warriors. Le Devoir publie une
photo sous laquelle on peut lire: "La foule a
Chateauguay qui avait chaleureusement
applaudi l'arrivee de l'armee a mains apprecie,
hier, cette poignee de mains aux Warrior." 36
Quant a La Presse, elle ecrit "Une poignee de
main trap cordiale?" 37 Cette poignee de main
allait demontrer la bonne foi de l'Armee et etre
appreciee a sa juste valeur lors du
demantdement des barricades a Chateauguay.
Le 2 7 aout l'Armee do it intervenir ala suite
de l'echec des negociations. Le lieutenantgeneral Kent Foster tiendra une conference de
presse le lendemain, pour expliquer a la
population qu'il s'agit maintenant d'une
operation militaire. Mais, en plus de la
conference, on present un video qui revele les
installations et les armements des Warriors.
Les joumaux seront impressionnes du resultat.
Le Journal de Montreal mentionne "Plus que la
conference de presse du lieutenant-general
Foster, c'est le visionnement du video prepare
par les Forces armees qui en a fait reflechir
plus d'un. "38 L'Armee demontre aussi par ce
video qu'elle est en position pour faire face ala
situation. The Globe and Mail ecrit "Army
ready for combat video indicates." 39
Le 30 aout, coup de theatre a Chateauguay.
Les Warriors aident l'Armee a demanteler les
barricades. Les journaux finissent par
reconnaftre la strategie du lieutenant-colonel
Gagnon. The Toronto Star ecrit "Lt. Col. Robin
Gagnon was able to accomplish a feat which

August 30th saw a theatrical turn of events
as the Warriors helped the Army dismantle the
barricades. The newspapers gave credit to the
strategy employed by Lieutenant-Colonel
Gagnon. The Toronto Star wrote, "Lt.-Col.
Robin Gagnon was able to accomplish a feat
which had eluded the provincial police and
three levels of government for 50 days." 40 The
response was the same in LaPresse, "Today we
realize that a handshake gave better results
than all the discussions undertaken at the
negotiating table between the government and
the Mohawk nation of Kanesatake and
Kahnawake. "41
The Army continued to use press
conferences to explain its actions. On
September 4th, a seizure of weapons in
Kahnawake led to a display described by Le
Journal de Montreal as, "The arsenal of death
seized by the S.Q." 42 Pictures of weapons
joined by articles certainly justified the
intervention of the Army in the eyes of the
readers. On the contrary, in Oka, the strategy
in place was one of a war of nerves. The
newspapers fully understood the scenario43 as
confirmed in this statement by Christopher
Young, "Army forceful but not abusive." 44
Jocelyn Coulon of Le Devoir was certainly
the journalist who best described the military
strategy: "In spite of everyone, the Army chose
to speak with the Warriors rather than to
strike." 45

D. The Perception of the Army
he message and strategies used by the
Army gained it the support ofthe press. At
the beginning of the conflict, despite the death
of an officer of the Surete du Quebec, the
Mohawks benefited from popular support. Peter
Worthington wrote at the end of July:

T

Regardless of who is (mostly) right or wrong at Oka,
the confrontation between the Mohawks and the
Quebec police (not to mention local citizens) has
rallied support from Indians across the country. 46
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had eluded provincial police and three levels of
government for 50 days." 40 Meme chose dans
La Presse: "Aujourd'hui on cons tate que cette
poignee de main a donne de meilleurs resultats
que tousles blablablas echanges ala table des
negociations entre les gouvernements et la
nation mohawk de Kanesatake et
Kahnawake." 41
L'Armee continuera d'utiliser les
conferences pour expliquer ses actions. Le 4
septembre, une saisie d'armes a Kahnawake
donnera lieu a une exhibition qui sera ainsi
decrite par Le Journal de Montreal: "L'arsenal
de la mort saisi par la SQ." 42 Des photos
d'armes jointes aux articles ont certainement
justifies !'intervention de l'Armee aux yeux des
lecteurs. Par contre, a Oka, la strategie en
place en est une de guerre des nerfs. Les
journaux comprendront bien le scenario 43 ce
qui amenera Christopher Young a affirmer
"Army forceful but not abusive. "44
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But the situation became more and more
uncontrollable; the population and the press
demanded that the Army be called. 'The time
has come for troops to be deployed. The
security of the population must take precedence
over the political image of a Premier who is still
haunted by the ghost of 1970. This situation
shows no resemblance." 47 Therefore, eight out
of 10 Quebecois approved of Premier Bourassa's
decision to call upon the Army. 48 Thanks to
their discipline and courage, the soldiers quickly
gained the respect of journalists, as witnessed

Le soldat Stephane Degagne (2e bataillon. Royal 22e
Regiment) et Lasagne dans unface dface qui semble
pour le mains interesser les medias.

Private Stephane Degagne (2nd Battalion, Royal 22e
Regiment) and Lasagna in a corifrontation, which
seems of particular interest to the media.
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Jocelyn Coulon du Le Devoir aura
certainement ete le journaliste qui aura le
mieux decrit la strategie militaire: "Envers et
contre taus, l'armee a choisi de parler avec les
Warriors plut6t que de frapper." 45

D. La perception de l'Armee

L

e message et la strategie de l'Armee lui
attireront les faveurs de la presse.

Au debut du conflit, malgre la mort d'un
agent de la Surete du Quebec, les Mohawks
beneficient de l'appui populaire. Peter
Worthington ecrit ala fin du mois de juillet:
Regardless of who is (mostly) right or wrong at Oka,
the confrontation between the Mohawks and Quebec
police (not to mention local citizen) has rallied support
from Indians across the country. 46

Mais la situation deviendra de plus en plus
intenable; la population et les journaux
demanderont l'appel de l'Armee. "Le temps est
venu que des troupes soient deployees. La
securite d'une population doit primer sur
l'image politique d'un premier ministre que le
spectre de 1970 pourchasse toujours. La
situation ne presente aucune ressemblance. "47
Huit Quebecois sur dix vont done approuver la
decision du premier ministre Bourassa de faire
appel a l'Armee. 48 Grace a leur discipline eta
leur sang-froid, les militaires s'attireront
rapidement le respect des j oumalistes. Voyons
quelques titres: "New respect for our army," 49
"Saluting our soldiers," 50 "The army shows
restraint, "51 "Hommage au sang-froid de l'armee
et des policiers," 52 "Give armed Forces just
due, "53 "Praising the actions of Canadian Armed
Forces, "54 ''The heroes of Oka. "55 La population
et les journalistes sont surtout impressionnes
par l'aspect non-violent de !'intervention
militaire. Mais pendant ce temps, on critique
de plus en plus le comportement des Warriors.
Dissidents battus, vandalisme et saccage des maisons
dont les habitants ont ete expulses manu militari ..
. Tout cela n'est apparemment d'aucun interet pour
notre Commission des droits de la personne et pour
les defenseurs professionnels des veuves et des

by the following titles: "New Respect for our
Army," 49 "Saluting our soldiers," 50 ''The Army
shows restraint, "51 "Tribute to the courage of
the army and police," 52 "Give Armed Forces
due," 53 "Praising the actions of the Canadian
Armed Forces, "54 and "The heroes of Oka. "55
Citizens and joumalists were most impressed
by the non-violent approach of the military
intervention. Meanwhile, criticism began to
mount against the actions taken by the
Mohawks:
The beating of dissenters, vandalism and ransacking
of houses from which the inhabitants had been
expelled by force .... All of this is apparently of no
interest to our Human Rights Commission nor to the
professional defenders of widows and the oppressed,
but the common mortal has already formed his
opinion on the credibility of the Warriors as
spokesmen for the Mohawk nation. 56

Image also played a very big role. The
seizure of weapons in Kahnawake and the
ransack of residences in Oka 57 quickly
weakened the small amount of credibility that
remained for the Warriors.
At the end of the crisis on September 26,
1990, the Army's prestige was at its highest.
Jean Francoeur of Le Devoir declared:
In regards to Quebec public opinion, the Army will
have been the big discovery of the native crisis. So
while the soldiers have begun returning to their
bases, the public can't stop praising these young
men whose behaviour deeply impressed all during
these days which could have, any one, turned to
tragedy: Self control, restraint, discipline and even
a surprising coolness in communication . . . All of
this, under an unfailing lucky star, almost faultlessly.
The Army ends the affair with all honour, the honour
of peace. 5 8

The same sentiments were found in Le Soleil:
The professionalism shown in operations in the field
also amazed all those who, glued to the T.V. screen,
were able to observe the soldiers at work. All the
manoeuvres were clearly written in a working plan
that left no room for improvisation and that led to the
surrounding of the Warriors, after the dismantling of
the barricades. Even in the most intense moments of
confrontation, the soldiers ofthe Royal22nd Regiment
were capable of fulfilling their mission without the
use of violence. They well deserve this tip of the hat. 59
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opprimes, mais le commun des mortels aura deja
forme son opinion sur la credibilite des Warriors
comme porte-parole de Ia nation mohawk. 56

L'image aura aussi un role tres important
ajouer. La saisie des armes a Kahnawake et le
saccage des residences a Oka57 affaibliront tres
tot le peu de credibilite des Warriors.
A l'issue de la crise d'Oka, soit le 26
septembre 1990, le prestige de l'Armee est a
son plus haut. Jean Francoeur du Le Devoir
declare:
L'armee canadienne aura ete pour !'opinion
quebecoise, la grande revelation de la crise
amerindienne. Alors que les soldats ont commence
a regagner leurs casemes, le public ne tarit pas
d'eloges a l'endroit de ces jeunes hommes dont le
comportement a vivement impressionne pendant
toutes ces journees dont chacune aurait pu tourner
a Ia tragedie: maitrise, retenue, discipline et meme
une etonnante fraicheur dans Ia communication ...
Le tout, sous une indefectible bonne etoile, presque
sans bavure.
L'armee s'en tire avec taus les honneurs, les honneurs
de la paix. 58

Memes eloges dans Le Soleil:
Le professionnalisme demontre dans les operations
sur le terrain a aussi epate taus ceux qui, rives a leur
ecran de television, ont pu observer les militaires au
travail. Toutes les manoeuvres s'inscrivaient
visiblement dans un plan de travail qui ne laissait
place a aucune improvisation et qui a abouti a
l'encerclement des Warriors, apres le demantelement
des barricades. Meme dans les moments les plus
in tenses des confrontations, les soldats du Royal22e
ont ete capables de remplir leur mission sans recourir
ala violence. Ils meritent bien ce coup de chapeau. 59

E. La presse et Ia strategie de
communication de l'Armee
endant le deroulement de la crise d'Oka,
nous retrouvons peu d'articles de presse
consacres a la strategie de communication de
l'Armee. Les communications sont analysees
dans des perspectives differentes. Lise
Bissonnette du Le Devoir se penchera sur le
processus d'information en periode de crise.

P

Ce que l'armee canadienne est en train de demontrer
magistralement, avec ses rencontres civilisees avec
la presse et les renseignements cruciaux qu'elle y
transmet, c'est qu'il y a moyen d'agir intelligemment
en temps de crise. 60

E. The Press and the Army's
Communication Strategy
uring the unfolding of the Oka crisis, few
press articles were found concerning the
Army's communication strategy.
Communications were analyzed under different
perspectives. Lise Bissonnette of Le Devoir
examined the information process in a period
of crisis.

D

What the Canadian Army is in the process of
masterfully demonstrating, with its civilized meetings
with the press and the crucial information it gives out
at these meetings, is that there exists a means of
acting intelligently in a time of crisis. 60

An article by Daniel Drolet published in the
Ottawa Citizen, goes into even more detail in its

analysis. The author shows that the Army
knew very well how to use the media in order to
attain its goals.
With news conferences and slick videos, the Canadian
Forces have waged a stiff war of words against the
Mohawk Warrior atOka and Kahnawake. But experts
in military strategy say there's a purpose to the war:
The Army is preparing the public for potential
bloodshed, and trying to shield itself from blame.
And it's doing so by increasingly sophisticated
dealings with the media. 61

Daniel Lemay of La Presse also examined
the subject. Accordingtohim, theArmyrealized
that "the media was an unavoidable reality" 62
and therefore it adapted to the situation. For
Lemay, the novelty was the Army's strategy of
transparency that was shown by the fact that
the public was kept in direct contact with the
military hierarchy. However, the author realized
that,
this "openness" was part of their strategy. The Army
knew full well that the Warriors and their Mohawk
supporters watched television like everyone else ...
and that they saw lots of soldiers. The effect of the
media could only have added to the dissuasive force
created by the deployment of the 5th Brigade. The
modern media participates in events as much as it
describes them. 63

Also, a number of articles appeared
concerning the role of the television during the
crisis. 64 However, it was not until the end of the
conflict that one gets a clear understanding of
the vast popularity of the Army. On October

42
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Un article de Daniel Drolet, paru dans The
Ottawa Citizen, va beaucoup plus en detail

dans I' analyse. L'auteur demontre que l'Armee
sait tres bien utiliser les medias pour atteindre
ses buts.
With news conferences and slick videos, the Canadian
Forces have waged a stiff war of words against the
Mohawk Warrior atOka and Kahnawake. But experts
in military strategy say there's a purpose to the war:
The army is preparing the public for potential
bloodshed, and trying to shield itself from blame.
And it's doing so by increasingly sophisticated dealing
with the media. 61

Daniel Lemay de La Presse s'est aussi
penche sur le sujet. Selon lui, les militaires se
sont rendu compte que "les medias
representaient une realite incontournable" 62 et
se sont adaptes a la situation. Pour ce
journaliste, la nouveaute de l'Armee est la
strategie de transparance qui fut demontree
par le fait que le public est entre en contact
direct avec la hierarchie militaire. Mais 1'auteur
reconnaft que
cette "ouverture" faisait partie de la strategie des
militaires. L'Armee savait tres bien que les Warriors
et leurs supporters Mohawks regardaient la television
comme toutle monde ... et qu'ils voyaient beau coup
de soldats. L'effet media ne peut qu'avoir ajoute ala
force dissuasive du deploiement de la 5e Brigade.
Les medias modernes participent aux evenements
autant qu'ils les decrivent. 63

De plus, quelques articles paraftront sur le
role de la television pendant cette crise. 64 Mais
il faudra attendre la fin du conflit pour bien
saisir la grande popularite de l'Armee. Le 14
octobre 1990, la Federation professionnelle
des joumalistes du Quebec et !'Association
canadienne des journalistes ont tenu une
discussion-bilan de la crise. Conclusion des
journalistes: la disponibilite des militaires
explique ce succes.
The Canadian army emerged from the recent Mohawk
crisis with a better public image than the Siirete du
Quebec in part because the army accommodated the
media better than the SQ. members of a Quebec
journalists association agreed Sunday. 65

14, 1990, theQuebecFederationofProfessional
Journalists and the Canadian Association of
J oumalists held a discussion of the final results
of the crisis. The journalists' conclusion: The
availability of the soldiers explains the
successful end.
The Canadian Army emerged from the recent Mohawk
crisis with a better public image than the Siirete du
Quebec in part because the Army accommodated the
media better than the S.Q., members of a Quebec
journalists association agreed Sunday. 65

Whereas, certain participants mentioned
that the Army controlled information.
In fact, according to what was said by those who
were, day after day, behind or in front of the
barricades, the Army regularly provided material for
television which was filmed at the site of the hostilities,
in this way allowing themselves the control of what
was subsequently shown to the public. 66

During a luncheon discussion organized
by la Societe des relationnistes du Quebec,
Jean-Claude Cloutier, who was the author of
the Army's communication plan, summed up
what he considered the key to success in the
summer's public relations campaign.
A precise message, a pro-active approach which went
beyond the demands of journalists and a very
structured public relations machine "glued" to the
operations division, that of the decision makers ... 67

Major Richard Larouche, who also
participated in the events, recalled the three
principal themes of the Army's communication
plan.
The soldiers wouldn't fire first at the Warriors after
they surrounded them.
And the Army would however fire back with force if
fired upon.
And the Army was only in the area at the invitation
of the Quebec government and would leave
immediately when asked. 68

This effectively was the Army's message.

Or, certains participants mentionneront
que l'Armee a contr6le !'information.
En effet, selon les propos tenus par ceux qui jour
apres jour etaient presents devant ou derriere les
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La presence constante des medias jut certainement une des caractenstiques du conjlit de l' ete 1990.

The constant presence of the media was certainly a characteristic of the conflict of the summer of 1990.

barricades. rarmee a regulierement fourni aux postes
de television des films tournes sur les lieux des
hostilites s'allouant ainsi un droit de gestion sur
!'information communiquee ensuite au public. 66

Lors d'un dejeuner-causerie organise par
la Societe des relationnistes du Quebec, JeanClaude Cloutier, qui fut le stratege du plan de
communication de l'Armee, resumera ainsi ce
qu'il considere Ia clef du succes de I' operation
de relations publiques de l'ete:
Un message precis, une approche "proactive"
consistant a aller aux devants des demandes des
journalistes et un appareil de relations publiques
tres structure, "colle" sur le bloc operationnel, celui
des preneurs de decisions ... s7

Le major Richard Larouche, qui participait
lui aussi a I' evenement, rappellera les trois
principaux themes du plan de communication
de l'Armee:
The soldiers wouldn't fire first at the Warriors after
they surrounded them.
And the Army would however fire back with force if
fired upon.
And the Army was only in the area at the invititation
of the Quebec government and would leave
immediately when asked. 68

Ce fut effectivement le message de l'Armee.

Conclusion

t the end of this study we can establish
that the newspapers gave a fairly clear
representation of the Army's intentions and
messages. This becomes even more clear when
the papers themselves examined their role in
the crisis as well as their relations with the
Armed Forces.

A

The Army, for its part, put in place a plan
of communication which was followed to the
letter by the different groups involved. The
military was able to convince media
representatives of the appropriateness of its
actions by adopting a policy of openness. But
the Army also knew how to associate with the
media in order to get its messages across and
thus to influence events.

Finally, thought must be given to the context
in which the news media found itself and also
to the question of the Canadian duality in this
regard. These are remarks (so as not to say
certain impressions) that have arisen following
the writing of this article.
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Conclusion

la suite de cette etude, il no us est possible
d'affirmer que les journaux ant assez
bien represente les intentions et les messages
de l'Armee. Cette reflexion a meme ete beaucoup
plus en profondeur lorsque les journaux se
sont interroges sur leur role dans cette crise et
sur leurs relations avec les Forces canadiennes.

A

L'Armee, pour sa part, a mis en place un
plan de communication qui a ete suivi a la
lettre par les differents intervenants. Les
militaires ant su convaincre les representants
des medias de la justesse de leurs actions en
adoptant une politique d'ouverture. Mais
l'Armee a su egalement s'associer aux medias
pour faire passer ses messages et influencer
les evenements.
Enfin, il nous faudrait parler du contexte a
l'interieur duquel se retrouve le mediajoumal
et la dualite canadienne. 11 s'agit ici de propos
(pour ne pas dire de certaines impressions) qui
se degagent a la suite de la redaction du
present article.
Mentionnons tout d'abord que les journaux
francophones ont effectue des analyses assez
differentes de celles des joumaux anglophones,
particulierement au debut de la crise. Les
anglophones sympathisaient beaucoup plus
avec les Mohawks que ne le faisaient les
francophones.

Let us first mention that the francophone
newspapers undertook fairly different analyses
than those of the anglophone papers,
particularly at the beginning of the crisis. The
anglophone press sympathised much more
with the Mohawks than did that of the
francophones.
We also found a greater diversity of
commentaries and analyses in the fran cop hone
newspapers. The English papers often
reproduced articles written by a press agency.
Lastly, let us mention all the marketing
mechanisms that can reveal interesting
questions. How, in fact, did the papers use the
Oka crisis to augment sales? Well-chosen
photographs can have a strong influence upon
consumers. In regards to the television, there
remains much research to be done. It seems to
us that certain journalists lacked
professionalism in broadcasting scenes of
gratuitous violence or scenes promoting racism.
But that is an entirely different question.

Photos provided by the Canadian Forces
Photographic Unit.

Les photographies proviennent de l'Unite
de photographie des Forces canadiennes.

Ensuite nous avons retrouve une plus
grande diversite de commentaires et d'analyses
dans les journaux francophones. Nos journaux
anglophones reproduisent souvent des articles
ecrits par une agence d'information.
Enfin, mentionnons toute la mecanique de
mise en marche qui pourrait reveler des chases
interessantes. Comment, eneffet,lesjournaux
ont-ils utilise la crise d'Oka pour mousser les
ventes? L'image, par le biais de la photo, peut
fortement influencer les consommateurs.
Quant a la television, il y aurait toute une
recherche a faire. Il nous semble que certains
journalistes ant manque de professionnalisme
en diffusant des scenes de violence gratuite ou
des scenes pr6nant le racisme. Mais il s'agit ici
d'une toute autre question.
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